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Abstract
What are the equilibrium features of a market where a sizeable por-
tion of traders face career concerns? This question is central to our
understanding of Þnancial markets that are increasingly dominated
by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated port-
folio management that captures key features of the US mutual fund
industry and we embed it into an asset pricing set-up. Fund man-
agers diﬀer in their ability to understand market fundamentals, and
in every period investors choose a fund. In equilibrium, the presence
of career concerns induces uninformed fund managers to churn, i.e.
to engage in trading even when they face a negative expected return.
As churning plays the role of noise trading, the asset market displays
non-fully informative prices and positive (and high) trading volume.
The equilibrium relationship between fund return and net fund ßows
displays a skewed shape that is consistent with stylized facts. The
robustness of our core results is probed from several angles.
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1 Introduction
There has been a substantial increase in the institutional ownership of cor-
porate equity around the world in recent decades. On the New York Stock
Exchange, for example, the percentage of outstanding corporate equity held
by institutional investors has increased from 7.2% in 1950 to 49.8% in 2002
(NYSE Factbook 2003). For OECD countries as a whole, institutional own-
ership now accounts for around 30% of corporate equity (Nielsen [25]).
Institutional traders may be guided by incentives that are not fully cap-
tured by standard models in Þnance.1 Consider, for example, the case of
US mutual funds, which make up a signiÞcant proportion of institutional in-
vestors in equity markets.2 Because of SEC regulations, most mutual funds
charge fees that are independent of performance.3 Their revenue depends
only on the amount of assets that investors choose to entrust to them. At
the same time, there is a substantial amount of empirical evidence that in-
vestors shift their money towards funds that have performed well in the recent
past creating a ßow-performance relationship (Ippolito [21] and Chevalier
and Ellison [5]). Funds have implicit incentives to impress investors in the
current period in order to retain their investor base and attract new busi-
ness in future periods. Indeed, Chevalier and Ellison present evidence that
funds alter their behavior in response to such implicit incentives. Given the
size of the mutual fund industry, such behavior is likely to aﬀect prices and
quantities in Þnancial markets. In this paper, we consider the theoretical
implications of the situation just described. In particular, we ask: What are
the equilibrium features of a Þnancial market in which a sizeable portion of
the traders face implicit incentives of the kind that drive US mutual funds?
As a starting point, we draw upon the burgeoning theoretical literature on
career concerns for experts (e.g. Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa [19], Scharf-
stein and Stein [29], Prendergast and Stole [28], and Ottaviani and Sørensen
[26]). An expert is an agent whose type determines his ability to understand
the state of the world. This diﬀers from classical career concerns (Holm-
1Allen [1] presents persuasive arguments for the importance of Þnancial institutions to
asset pricing.
2According to the NYSE Factbook 2003, around 37% of equity held by institutions in
2003 was held by mutual funds; this number does not include state and private pension
funds.
3See Elton, Gruber, and Blake [11] for details. Only 1.7% of US mutual funds charged
incentive fees in 1999.
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strom [18]) in which the agents type determines his ability to exert eﬀort.
Expert models are particularly suited to analyze agency relationships in Þ-
nancial setups, in which the key driver appears to be the ability to pick the
right portfolio rather than pure eﬀort exertion. Some expert models have
been used to analyze precisely such settings. For example, Scharfstein and
Stein [29] develop an agency theoretic model in which experts mimic the de-
cisions of other experts due to career concerns. However, that paper, and
other such applications, consider only partial equilibrium analysis in which
prices are Þxed. Our goal is to develop a Þnancial equilibrium model in
which prices are determined endogenously by the behavior of experts with
career concerns. This enables us to examine the eﬀects of career concerned
behavior on Þnancial market variables.4
In our model there are three classes of agents: investors who cannot
trade directly (we refer to them as investors), traders who trade on behalf of
investors (fund managers), and other investors who trade directly (we refer
to them as traders). It is a dynamic model: in every period the investors
select among available fund managers. Fund managers face career concerns,
which are the driving force behind our results.5
In the baseline model, the form of the payment from the investor to
the fund manager is exogenously given and does not depend directly on
performance. As discussed above, this assumption applies by and large to
US mutual funds. This allows us to make our main points in a simple,
tractable model. Later in the paper we show that the results are still valid
in an environment with endogenous contracting, as long as only short-term
contracts are feasible.
There are two periods. In each period there is a market for a risky asset,
which is liquidated at the end of the period. In the beginning of the Þrst
period, investors entrust a fund manager with a sum of money. The fund
manager trades on their behalf, and at the end of the period the investors
observe the return obtained by the manager. At the beginning of the second
period the investors can choose to retain the current fund manager or to
replace him with a new one. Again, the fund manager trades on behalf of
4It also enables us to examine whether career concerns can persist in a setting where
prices play both informational and allocational roles.
5For tractability, we abstract from agency problems between the fund company and
the fund manager, such as those documented by Chevalier and Ellison [6]. In our set-up,
the fund manager and the fund company are the same entity: the terms fund manager
and mutual fund can be (and are) used interchangeably.
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the investors.
Fund managers are characterized by their ability to observe market funda-
mentals. A good fund manager is more likely to learn the liquidation value of
the asset before the asset is liquidated. In equilibrium investors can attempt
to infer the ability of their fund manager from the outcome of trading.
The rest of the market is made of a large number of uninformed traders.
Traders acts as market makers and post bid and ask prices. As traders are
rational, there may be an endogenous bid-ask spread to account for adverse
selection. In the baseline case, we make a simplifying assumption: each
trader is short-lived and does not know what happened in the past (in par-
ticular, they do not know if they Þnd themselves in the Þrst or in the second
period). Later in the paper, we show that this assumption is not necessary
if one considers a more complex model with overlapping generations of fund
managers.
The main Þndings are:
1. Without career concerns, prices are fully informative, and trading vol-
ume is zero. As a benchmark case, suppose that the fund manager
has no career concerns (because the decision to replace him or retain
him is exogenous). Then there is no equilibrium in which trade occurs.
Absent career concerns, we fall back on a familiar no-trade result: in
the absence of exogenous shocks and risk-sharing motives, there can be
no trade in markets with asymmetric information.
2. With career concerns, prices are not fully informative, and trading vol-
ume is positive. If the decision to replace or retain the fund manager
is endogenous, there exists a churning equilibrium in which a young
manager always trades. If he is informed, he trades correctly. If not,
he churns, that is, he buys or sells at random. If an uninformed young
manager does not churn, he signals his lack of information and gets
replaced in the following period.
From the viewpoint of the rest of the asset market, churners play the
role of noise traders because their orders are not correlated with fun-
damentals. They lessen the adverse selection problem for informed
traders, who now have opportunities for proÞtable trade. This closes
the circle because ex post the investor has a strict incentive to retain
a successful trader.
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3. Trade volume is high. In the churning equilibrium, trading volume is
not only positive but also large: all young fund managers and all in-
formed old managers engage in trading. Below, we examine the existing
literature and interpret this Þnding as a potential solution to the trade
volume puzzle.
4. The endogenous compensation function is skewed against average per-
formers. In the churning equilibrium, achieving an average return (as
a result of non-trading) is as bad as achieving a negative return (as a
result of a wrong trade). Both outcomes signal poor information and
lead to the manager being replaced. Instead a positive outcome ensures
that the manager is kept. The endogenous incentive structure is such
the implicit compensation of an average performer is closer to that of
an under-performer than to that of an over-performer.
While our model may be special, the intuition behind this result is
general. If bad agents have less useful private information than good
agents, their expectations of fundamentals are less likely to deviate
from the market expectation (the technical conditions for this to be
true are examined in Section 3). Hence, bad agents are less likely
to beneÞt by trading, and in equilibrium lack of trade must carry a
reputational cost. This in turn creates an incentive for fund managers
to take excessive risk. An uninformed manager prefers randomizing
over performance rather than getting stuck with an average outcome.
Both the shape of the implicit compensation function and the risk-
taking behavior are consistent with the Þndings of Chevalier and Ellison
[5]. Their empirical ßow-performance relationship displays convexity,
and, as a consequence, recently established funds face a measurable
incentive to increase the variance of performance.
It is useful to place the present contribution in the context of the litera-
ture on the trade volume puzzle. Any attempt to model Þnancial trading
faces the mighty obstacle of no-trade theorems.6 Under general conditions,
the arrival of new private information cannot generate trade among rational
traders. The intuition is related to Akerlofs lemons problem. A trader who
shows willingness to buy (sell) a given asset signals that he has private infor-
mation indicating that the asset is worth more (less) than its market price.
6See Brunnermeier [4] for an overview of the topic and for further references.
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In equilibrium, this adverse selection problem results in zero trading. To get
around the no-trade issue, the Þnance literature, beginning with Grossman
and Stiglitz [15], has assumed the presence of noise trading. Noise traders are
agents who must sell or buy because something has changed in their personal
situation. For instance they are compelled by unforeseen circumstances to
generate or utilize liquidity (hence, noise traders are sometimes referred to as
liquidity traders) or they need to buy particular securities to hedge against
new risks. The presence of noise traders reduces adverse selection and it
allows for trade by informed speculators.
However, noise trading theories have come under increasing attack for
their perceived inability to explain the order of magnitude of Þnancial trade.
While no conclusive evidence is available, many scholars are reluctant to
accept that the trading volumes observed on modern stock markets (over
$10 trillion in 2002 on the New York Stock Exchange) can be explained by
the kind of exogenous events that drive noise trading (Glaser and Weber
[13]). De Bondt and Thaler [8, p. 392] go as far as to say that the high trade
volume observed in Þnancial markets is perhaps the single most embarassing
fact to the standard Þnance paradigm. One solution to the trading volume
puzzle is to abandon the rational paradigm, for instance by allowing for
overconÞdence (e.g. Kyle and Wang [23] and Glaser and Weber [13]). Our
paper provides an alternative solution. The presence of implicit incentives
similar to those faced by US mutual funds is enough to generate a substantial
amount of trade. Moreover, the model yields testable implications, which are
discussed in the conclusion.
Our core results are derived in the simplest possible setting. We probe
the robustness of our conclusions by extending the analysis in several direc-
tions. First, we note that our game can have other perfect Bayesian equilibria
in which churning does not occur. We can, however, show that such equi-
libria are perverse: in these equilibria, investors must punish managers for
obtaining high returns on their behalf.
Second, we extend our analysis to incorporate a richer information struc-
ture. We show that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for churning to occur
is that a good fund manager is more likely than a bad fund manager to re-
ceive a signal about the liquidation value of the asset. If that mild condition
is satisÞed, there is a strict reputational cost of not trading. In equilibrium,
a fund manager who has received an uninformative signal prefers churning
to not trading.
Third, we allow for endogenous contracts and we show that the churning
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equilibrium exists as long as the contractual environment is not suﬃciently
rich to avoid career concerns. If investors and fund managers can sign long-
term (multi-period) contracts, churning disappears and trading volume is
zero. This is because the investor can commit not to replace a bad man-
ager, which eliminates career concerns. However, the churning equilibrium
still exists when contracts are endogenous but only short-term contracting
is available. Short-term contracts allow for payment contingent on current
performance but not payments contingent on future performance or on the
choice to retain the manager. The fund manager is replaced if he under-
performs, and this is suﬃcient to create career concerns and hence churning
equilibria.
Fourth, we deal with the awkward assumption that market makers do
not know in which period they live. This assumption was made to eliminate
a Þnal-period eﬀect and is unnecessary once we consider an inÞnite horizon.
We prove that the inÞnite-horizon game has a churning equilibrium in which
the fund manager always trades.
Finally, we examine the issue of investors returns. In our baseline model,
the investor must use a fund manager. However, the investors expected net
return of using a fund manager is strictly negative. This is a straightforward
consequence of the fact that the rational uninformed traders must make a zero
expected proÞt and that there are transaction costs. If we interpret a zero
return as the normalized return of holding the market portfolio, our result
should be taken to mean that investing in an actively managed fund generates
a lower net return than buying an index fund. If we remove the initial
assumption that investors have no choice, why would they choose active fund
management? An obvious way to deal with the issue of negative net returns
is to introduce noise traders. We show that a suﬃciently large probability
of exogenously-driven trade generates positive expected net returns for the
investor. The amount of noise trade needed to ensure a positive return goes to
zero as the transaction cost goes to zero. Note that the amount of churning is
unrelated to the amount of noise trading: if transaction cost is negligible, our
model predicts a constant (and high) level of trade volume for any positive
amount of noise trade.7
7One could also postulate that investors are irrational: for unmodeled psychological
reasons, they prefer to buy actively managed funds even if there is enough evidence to
conclude that index funds provide a better performance. While this behavioral explana-
tion is not entirely satisfactory at a conceptual level, it may be consistent with available
evidence. Despite the observation that actively managed funds underperform index funds
7
Our paper is closely linked to the pioneering work of Dow and Gorton [9].
They embed an agency problem between investors and their fund managers
into an asset pricing model and they show that under the optimal contract
fund managers have an incentive to trade even when they have no private
information, that is, they churn. In their model, some uninformed traders
are motivated by the desire to hedge against risks that arise with exogenous
probability. In equilibrium, the presence of an agency problem may generate
a high trade volume even in the presence of a small hedging component.8
While Dow and Gorton consider a static model with complete contracts, we
focus on a dynamic model with incomplete contracts, which is perhaps a
better representation of the mutual fund industry. As a consequence, we are
able to study phenomena of practical interest, such as the endogenous in-
centive structure faced by fund managers (the equilibrium ßow/performance
relationship) and the relationship between churning and seniority. We are
also able to show the optimality of non-contingent pay for fund management
companies, which is a common feature of the mutual fund industry in the
US and elsewhere.9
In a related paper, Allen and Gorton [2] present a model in which prices
can diverge from fundamentals (i.e., bubbles can form) due to churning by
portfolio managers. An earlier paper by Trueman [30] considers a delegated
portfolio management model in which the fund managers ability is unknown.
Compensation depends on performance and on the posterior belief on the
funds manager ability. Trueman shows that there is a churning equilibrium
in which uninformed fund managers trade. Our paper diﬀers in two respects.
First, Trueman assumes that the fund managers future compensation de-
pends on his posterior in an exogenously given way. Instead in our model,
future compensation depends on the investors retention decision, which is
endogenous. Second, Trueman considers a partial equilibrium model (and
therefore he cannot discuss trade volume) while we also take into account
the feedback that the fund managers trade has on the asset market. Fi-
nally, our paper bears a conection to Cuoco and Kaniel [7]. They show that
after accounting for expenses (see, for example, Gruber [16] or Wermers [31]), U.S. in-
vestors put only 12% of their delegated funds in index funds, and Europeans put just 2%
(The Economist [10])
8For further discussion of Dow and Gortons results, see Bhattacharya [3].
9It is worth noting here that ßat fees are commonly seen even in countries where regula-
tions do not place any restrictions on the charging of incentive fees (e.g. the Netherlands).
We provide one explanation for the optimality of such fees.
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exogenously speciÞed performance fees can have signiÞcant asset pricing im-
plications. Symmetric and asymmetric fees induce diﬀerent eﬀects. While
they consider a richer environment in continuous time with two risky assets,
we endogenize the managers compensation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The following section develops the
simplest model which is suﬃcient to generate our main results. Section 3
extends the baseline model in various directions: existence of other equilibria
besides the churning equilibrium; eﬀects of endogenous contracting; inÞnite-
horizon model; and positive net returns. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Baseline Case
To present the essence of our results, we begin by discussing a simple baseline
model. The main assumptions are: (1) investors must use active manage-
ment; (2) contracts are exogenously given; (3) there are only two periods
and market makers do not know in which period they live; and (4) a good
manager has perfect information while a bad manager has no private infor-
mation. All these assumptions are made for analytical convenience and are
relaxed in Section 3.
2.1 Model
Consider an economy with two periods, t = 1, 2. There is a single risk-neutral
principal (investor) and a large pool of ex-ante identical risk-neutral agents
(fund-managers). One of these is hired at random at t = 1 to trade for the
principal. At the end of the period, the principal may retain the agent or
hire a new one of average quality from the pool. The agent can be of two
types: θ ∈ {b, g} with probabilities 1 − γ and γ respectively. The type of
the agent is unknown to both the principal and the agent.
At each time period t, there is exactly one risky asset with liquidation
value v ∈ {0, 1} which occur with equal probability. The payoﬀ v is realized
at the end of each period and it is independent across periods. The agents
type θ and the asset payoﬀ v are independent.
At the end of each period, the principal can observe the net return ob-
tained by the agent. After such observation, the principal decides whether
to retain or Þre the fund manager.10
10The principal observes the return but not the portfolio choice or the liquidation value.
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There are a large number of risk-neutral short-lived uninformed rational
traders who act as market-makers. Half of them operate in t = 1, the other
half operate in t = 2. In each period t, the fund manager submits a market
order a ∈ A = {0, ∅, 1}, where 0 stands for sell one unit at highest available
price, 1 stands for buy one unit at lowest available price, and ∅, the empty
set, represents lack of activity. The traders observe the order and each of
them announces a price. Thus, the action of a trader consists of setting two











for a = 0.
The bid-ask spread pA − pB may be positive. The fund manager is free to
trade with any rational trader, and, when indiﬀerent between them, chooses
one at random. The traders are thus subject to Bertrand competition (as is
now standard in the literature, following Glosten and Milgrom [14] and Kyle
[22]) and each sets prices equal to the expected value of the asset conditional
on the order.
We make one important simplifying assumption. Traders do not know
whether they are in period 1 or 2. Therefore, they are unable to condition
their action on the fund managers seniority. In section 3 we show that this
assumption is not necessary if we consider an inÞnite-horizon model with
overlapping generations of fund managers.
The fund managers information structure is common to both periods
and it depends on the fund managers type. A good fund manager receives
a signal conveying the true liquidation value v, while a bad fund manager
receives no signal. The signal s can take three values, 0, 1, and ∅, and it is
determined as follows:
s (θ, v) =
½
v if θ = g
∅ if θ = b
In the present setup, s reveals θ. When the fund manager learns his signal
he also learns his type. The investor does not observe either the signal or the
type.
The fund manager incurs a cost of trading , > 0 every time he buys
or sells. The cost is introduced in order to break the indiﬀerence between
trading and not trading in favor of the latter. Most of the results we present
are obtained for the asymptotic case ,→ 0.
As it will become apparent later, this assumption is immaterial to our results. This
property is a feature of the simple setting used here. See Prat [27] for a more general
analysis of the eﬀect of the structure of the principals information on the agents behavior.
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In each period, the net return on investment is
χ(a, pA, pB, v, ,) =
 0 if a = ∅v − pA − , if a = 1
pB − v − , if a = 0
Write a time-t mixed strategy for an agent as the mapping at : S → ∆A.
In this baseline version of the model, the contractual arrangement be-
tween the investor and the fund manager is exogenously determined. Note
that we abstract throughout from agency problems that may arise within
fund management companies. Thus, mutual fund managers can be identiÞed
with mutual funds companies. Accordingly, we model payoﬀs to managers
along the lines of the fees charged by mutual fund companies. Given return
χ, the payment from the investor to the manager is
t = αχ+ β,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0,∞). In most of the results of the present section
we focus on the case α → 0. However, the fact that α > 0 guarantees
that when career concerns are absent, the interests of the fund manager are
aligned with those of the investor.
For simplicity there is no discounting. The investors payoﬀ is given by
χ1 − t1 + χ2 − t2. The fund managers payoﬀ is t1 + t2.
To summarize, timing is:
t = 1  The fund manager learns s1 and chooses a1;
 Traders observe a1 and set prices;
 The investor observes the net return obtained by the manager; All
other traders observe v; Payments to the fund manager are made.
t = 2  The investor retains the incumbent or hires the challenger.
 The fund manager learns s2 and chooses a2;
 Traders observe a2 and set prices;
 The investor observes the net return obtained by the manager; All
other traders observe v; Payments to the fund manager are made.
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2.2 No Trade without Career Concerns
We Þrst establish the benchmark case without career concerns, in order to re-
assure readers that our core results are indeed due to the presence of implicit
incentives and not to other features of our dynamic model.
Career concerns arise when the fund manager knows that his chance of
being replaced depends on his behavior. To eliminate the implicit incentive
component, assume that the probability that the Þrst period fund manager is
retained is exogenously given by r ∈ [0, 1] and it is stochastically independent
from any other variable in the model.
Proposition 1 For any exogenous r ∈ [0, 1], there is no trade in equilibrium.
Proof. For a fund manager with θ = b, the expected value of the asset
is E [v] = 1
2
. The bad fund manager never buys because
E [v]− , < 1
2
≤ pA.
The good manager is willing to buy if
pA ≤ v − ,.
If the good fund manager buys, it means that he knows v = 1. But then
the ask price should be pA = 1, which is a contradiction. An analogous
contradiction arises when we consider selling instead of buying.
Proposition 1 is akin to a no-trade theorem. In the absence of career con-
cerns, our model does not support positive trade volumes. When fund man-
agers are not career-motivated, they trade optimally. Uninformed traders
realize that because of adverse selection they can only lose from trading with
fund managers. Trade cannot occur in equilibrium.
If the exogenous retention rate r is set to one, our model can be inter-
preted as a situation in which the investor and the fund manager are the
same person: an informed investor. Unsurprisingly, there cannot be trade in
such a setting.
2.3 Churning with Career Concerns
We now return to the initial model and let the retention choice be made by the
investor. What follows is our core result on the existence and characterization
of the churning equilibrium:
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Proposition 2 For α and , low enough, there exists an equilibrium in which:11
1. The investor retains the fund manager if he trades correctly and replaces
him if he makes a wrong trade or no trade.
2. A good fund manager always trades. A bad fund manager churns if
t = 1 and he does not trade if t = 2. Formally,
at (st) = st for t = 1, 2, st 6= ∅
a1 (∅) =
½
0 with probability 1
2
1 with probability 1
2
a2 (∅) = ∅











2 + 3γ − γ2 .
Proof. Fund managers strategy at t = 2: At t = 2, a bad manager never






. A good fund manager with signal s = 1
is strictly better oﬀ buying if 1− pA − , > 0, which is satisÞed if
, < 1− pA = 1
2
(1− γ) ≡ , (1)
A good fund manager with s = 0 is better oﬀ selling if pB − , > 0, which is
also satisÞed under (1).
Investors belief : Given the price structure, only three possible Þrst-
period realizations of the gross return are possible: the one corresponding to
a succesful purchase or sale:




the one corresponding to an wrong purchase or sale:
χ1 = −pA = pB − 1 = −
1
2
(1 + γ)− ,;
11Namely, the equilibrium exists if α ≤ β and # < 12 (1− γ).
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and the one corresponding to no trade: χ1 = 0.
In the present equilibrium only the former two are observed. The re-
quirement that investors beliefs are consistent with equilibrium play implies
that
Pr (θ = g|χ1)












∈ [0, 1] if χ1 = 0
The return χ1 = 0, which corresponds to the action a = ∅, is oﬀ the equilib-
rium path at t = 1. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes no restriction. We
choose to set:12
Pr (θ = g|χ1 = 0) = 0.
Investors retaining strategy : Suppose (1) holds. A good fund manager
generates a positive net return while a bad fund manager generates a zero
net return. It is a best response for the investor to retain the fund manager
if and only if
Pr (θ = g|χ1) ≥ γ.
Combined with the posteriors above, this condition implies that the investor
retains the fund manager if and only if the fund manager trades successfully.
Good fund managers strategy at t = 1: A good fund manager who plays
a = s produces net return 1
2
(1− γ) − , in t = 1. He is retained and he
produces again the same net return in t = 2. His total payoﬀ is











If , is small enough to satisfy (1), it is easy to see that πg (a = s) is higher
than the payoﬀ that the fund manager would get if he plays a = ∅. It is also
obvious that πg (a = s) is higher than the payoﬀ the manager would get if he
plays a = 1− s.
Bad fund managers strategy at t = 1: A bad fund manager who does not
trade generates a zero net return in t = 1 and he is not retained. Therefore,
his total payoﬀ is
πb (a = ∅) = β.
12The proof also works with any Pr (θ = g|χ1 = 0) ∈ (0, γ).
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If instead the bad manager plays either a = 1 or a = 0 in t = 1, he is
successful with probability 1
2
. His expected net return at t = 1 is
1
2
− pA − , = −1
2
+ pB − , = −γ
2
− ,
If the churner is successful, he is retained and he does not trade at t = 2.
His total expected payoﬀ is




























Traders pricing strategy : The probability that the second-period fund
manager is good is equal to the probability that the manager is good in
t = 1 (because he is retained for sure) plus the probability that the manager
is bad and he is replaced with a good one:
Pr (θ = g|t = 2) = γ + 1
2
(1− γ) γ.
Second-period managers trade only if they are good. First-period managers
always trade, and churners randomize with equal probability between buying
and selling. Thus, by symmetry,
Pr (θ = g|a = 1) = Pr (θ = g|a = 0) = Pr (θ = g|a ∈ {0, 1}) .
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A trader who receives a buy or sell order computes the following posterior
probability:
γ ≡ Pr (θ = g|a ∈ {0, 1})
=
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} , θ = g)
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1})
=
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} , θ = g, t = 1) + Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} , θ = g, t = 2)
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} , t = 1) + Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} , t = 2)
=
·
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} |θ = g, t = 1)Pr (θ = g|t = 1)+
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} |θ = g, t = 2)Pr (θ = g|t = 2)
¸
Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} |t = 1) + Pr (a ∈ {0, 1} |t = 2)
=
Pr (θ = g|t = 1) + Pr (θ = g|t = 2)
1 + Pr (θ = g|t = 2)
=
γ + γ + 1
2
(1− γ) γ





2 + 3γ − γ2 .
The ask price is












(1 + γ) ,
and the bid price is










Proposition 2 identiÞes a churning equilibrium. All Þrst-period fund man-
agers trade. The good ones make correct trades by following their private
information. The bad ones randomize between buying and selling.
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The investor realizes that a successful trade may come from a lucky
churner. Still, she knows that a good manager is more likely to be right
and she revises her posterior upwards if she observes a successful trade. She
also knows that a wrong trade can only come from a bad manager, and she
believes that no-trade (an oﬀ-equilibrium event) is more likely to come from
a bad manager. Given this set of beliefs, the investor retains the Þrst-period
manager if and only if he has traded successfully.
A good manager makes positive returns in both periods (provided the
trading cost is low enough). He knows the liquidation value and he buys
or sells at prices that are strictly between 0 and 1. He is also certain to be
retained.
A bad manager faces a depressing choice between churning and non-
trading. If he churns, he makes negative expected return − γ
2
− , but he
has a 50% of being retained. If he does not trade, he makes a zero return
and he is Þred for sure. If the direct-stake parameter α is low enough (in
particular, lower than the Þxed payment), the bad manager prefers to churn.
Traders know that a market order may come from a good manager who
knows the liquidation value or a Þrst-period bad manager who is churning.
The price will be based on the probability that the order comes from a good
manager conditional on the presence of an order, which is
γ = Pr (θ = g|a ∈ {0, 1}) = γ 5− γ
2 + 3γ − γ2 ∈ (0, 1) .
One can check that the posterior γ is greater than the prior γ. This is due
to two factors. First, a good manager is more likely than a bad manager to
be retained. Second, a bad manager does not trade in the second period.
However, γ → γ when either γ → 0 or γ → 1. Given the posterior γ, traders
compute the bid price and the ask price. The bid-ask spread is simply γ and
it is increasing in γ. It tends to 1 when γ → 1 and it tends to zero when
γ → 0.
We now discuss in detail two important implications of Proposition 2: the
comparative statics of trading volume and the equilibrium incentives faced
by fund managers.
2.4 Comparative Statics of Trading Volume
Trading volume is the expected number of assets traded in an average period.
It can be deÞned as the average of the probability that a trade occurs at t = 1
17
and the probability that a trade occurs at t = 2. From Proposition 2, we can
easily compute trading volume in the churning equilibrium:
Corollary 3 The average trading volume is
w =
1 + Pr (θ = g|t = 2)
2
=
2 + 3γ − γ2
4
.
In the Þrst period, there is always trade. In the second period, trade
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Trading is at its lowest when almost all managers are bad. Still, the presence
of churning guarantees that trading volume is always above 1
2
.
What are expected payoﬀs in this equilibrium? As the expected payoﬀ of
traders is zero, the gross expected return over the two periods must be zero as
well. The expected net return, which is negative, is thus the expected number
of trades 2w times the trading cost: E (χ1 + χ2) = −2,w. The expected
payment from the investor to the fund manager over the two periods is:
E (t1 + t2) = E (αχ1 + β + αχ2 + β) = 2 (−α,w + β) .
The investors expected payoﬀ is:
E (χ1 − t1 + χ2 − t2) = −2 ((1− α) ,w + β) .
In this baseline model, the investors expected net payoﬀ is negative (but it
becomes arbitrarily close to zero if α, β, and , tend to zero). In section 3, we
will see that the net return becomes positive if a small proportion of traders
are noise traders.13
13The welfare properties of this model are uninteresting. As all market participants
are risk-neutral and have no hedging motive, trading is a zero-sum game. The only non-
18
2.5 Asymmetric Flow-Performance Relationship
A further consequence of Proposition 2 is that the implicit incentives of young
fund managers are skewed. The reputational reward for good performance
is higher in absolute terms than the reputational cost of bad performance.
The existence of such a ßow-performance relationship has been documented
empirically by Chevalier and Ellison [5]. In a seminal empirical study of a
large sample of income and growth funds from 1982 to 1992, they Þnd that
fund companies face an asymmetric ßow-performance relationship. Funds
with better past performance receive larger net in-ßows. However, starting
from avarage performance, the absolute eﬀect of an increase in performance
is greater than the absolute eﬀect of a decrease of the same size. This form of
convexity is much more evident for young funds. As a consequence, Chevalier
and Ellison also Þnd that young funds face incentives for excessive risk taking.
Equilibrium behavior in our model generates a similar, albeit more styl-
ized, picture. A fund manager who trades successfully (i.e. generates a
positive return) has an investment in-ßow of zero. A fund manager who
makes either a wrong trade (negative return) or no trade (average return)
has an investment in-ßow of −1. This translates into skewed implicit incen-
tives. To Þx ideas, let the explicit incentive component go to zero: α → 0.
The managers payoﬀ depend only on whether he is retained and it can be
written as
t1 + t2 =
 ββ
2β
if χ1 < 0
if χ1 = 0
if χ1 > 0
.
Like in Chevalier and Ellison, our young fund manager may have an incentive
to increase the variability of the Þrst-period return. If he is uninformed, he
prefers a lottery over χ1, which he achieves by churning, rather than χ1 = 0
for sure, which he could obtain by not trading.
The intuition behind the asymmetry of the ßow-performance relationship
goes beyond our simple set-up. In any model of career concerns for experts,
the value of an expert must depend on his ability to obtain information that
is not publicly available (see Zitzewitz [32]). If the expert is a fund manager,
his usefulness corresponds to his ability to form an opinion that diﬀers from
distributional eﬀect or market activity is the deadweight imposed by transaction costs.
A Utilitarian planner would just want to minimize trade. More insightful normative
implications could be obtained by including a microfounded hedging motive (Dow and
Gorton [9]).
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the market opinion. This leads a manager to identify assets that are over- or
under-priced. A better manager holds a portfolio that is farther away from
the market portfolio and, as consequence, generates a return that is less cor-
related to the market return (but on average higher). Such a manager should
garner reputational rewards. Conversely, a fund manager who systematically
tracks the market must have limited private information and should be less
sought after by rational investors. In equilibrium, managers who obtain re-
turns that are close to the market return must face some reputational cost.
3 Discussion and Extensions
It is important to probe the robustness of the Þndings of the previous section.
In this section, we discuss: (1) the robustness of churning; (2) endogenous
contracts; (3) inÞnite horizon; and (4) noise trading.
3.1 How robust is churning?
The core analysis focused on one particular equilibrium (the churning equi-
librium) given one particular information structure (good agents know every-
thing, bad agents know nothing). We now show that the churning equilibrium
is the most plausible one and that our results do not depend on the particular
information structure we chose for expositional purposes.
In order to abstract from pathological equilibria supported by carefully
chosen out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we carry out both of these exercises un-
der the assumption that an arbitrarily small proportion µ of managers are
naive, i.e., always play according to their signal. For pedagogical pur-
poses, it is useful to hold prices Þxed, interior, and symmetric about 1
2
,
and consider the partial equilibrium incentives for managers for arbitrary
pB = 1− pA ∈ (0, 12 ]. We make these two assumptions for the remainder of
this subsection. All results obtained in partial equilibrium hold a fortiori in
general equilibrium.
3.1.1 Non-churning equilibria
While churning need not be an essential property of all equilibria of our
baseline game, we shall show here that equilibria without churning must be
peculiar: in these equilibria, over some ranges of returns, investors must
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punish a manager for doing well. To be precise, denote the equilibrium
retention probabilities used by the investor by r(1), r(0), and r(−1) for the
the cases where the manager generates positive, zero, and negative returns
respectively. Now we can state:
Proposition 4 When α and , are suﬃciently small, in any equilibrium in
which managers do not churn, it cannot be the case that r(1) ≥ r(0) ≥ r(−1).
Proof. Since there are no career concerns at t = 2, it is easy to see that
optimal strategy at t = 2 are given by a2 = s2. Thus, investors have a
clear incentive to retain fund managers for whom bγ(χ1) > γ. Now consider
t = 1 strategies. To begin, notice that in any equilibrium when α and ,
are suﬃciently small, if r(1)+r(−1)
2
> r(0) fund managers who do not receive
information will churn. Suppose that r(1) ≥ r(0) ≥ r(−1). Consider the
payoﬀs to the informed (good) manager:
π (a1 = s1) = β + α(pB − ,) + r(1)v2
π (a1 = 1− s1) = β + α(pB − 1− ,) + r(−1)v2
π (a1 = ∅) = β + r(0)v2
where v2 represents payoﬀ from optimal behaviour at t = 2. Notice that
v2 ≥ β > 0. For α > 0 and , suﬃciently small, r(1) ≥ r(−1) ⇒ π(a1 =
s1) > π(a1 = 1−s1) and r(1) ≥ r(0)⇒ π(a1 = s1) > π(a1 = ∅). Thus, good
managers will play a1 = s1. Given the small fringe of naive managers, the
investors beliefs upon seeing zero return are not arbitrary. They must (at
least) be consistent with the equilibrium behaviour of good fund managers.
Thus, upon observing χ1 = 0, the investor knows that the manager cannot
be of type θ = g, and thus optimally, r(0) = 0. Under the maintained
hypothesis, this implies that r(−1) = 0. The two possible clases are r(1) =
r(0) = r(−1) = 0 (the manager is replaced for sure) and r(1) > r(0) =
r(−1) = 0. But under any arbitrary mixed strategy chosen by the bad
managers, it must be the case that bγ(χ1 > 0) > γ. Thus, r(1) = 0 cannot be
optimal for the investor. Thus, r(1) > 0, which implies that r(1)+r(−1)
2
> r(0),
and thus non-naive managers of type θ = b will churn.
The relative values of the equilibrium retention probabilities determine
the slope of the ßow-performance relationship discussed above. The interpre-
tation of this result is that any equilibrium where fund managers strategies
are diﬀerent from those identiÞed in Proposition 2, must be characterized by
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a ßow-performance relationship that is strictly decreasing over some range.
In other words, fund managers must be explicitly punished for doing better.
This is at odds with empirical Þndings.
3.1.2 A more general information structure
The core result was obtained under the assumption that the agent has an
extremely simple information structure: a good agent receives a perfectly
informative signal, a bad agent receives no signal. We now generalize the
information structure to allow a good agent to receive no signal and a bad
agent to receive an uninformative signal.
Suppose that the distribution of private signal s can be written as
Pr (s|v, θ) =
 ρθ if s = v1− ρθ − τ θ if s = ∅
τ θ if s = −v
,
where ρg, τ g, ρb, and τ b are parameters with values in the interval [0, 1] such
that ρg + τ g ≤ 1 and ρb + τ b ≤ 1. The information structure is based on the
implicit assumption that the signal is symmetric in v = 1 and v = 0. Our
core results were obtained under the assumption that ρg = 1 and τ g = ρb =
τ b = 0. The agent does not observe his own type θ.
We assume that the signal is useful, in the sense that it provides some
information on the valuation v (even for a bad agent). Moreover, a good
agent gets a more useful signal than a bad agent:
1 ≥ ρg > ρb > τ b > τ g ≥ 0. (2)
We now identify an important condition which implies that receiving
informative signals is good news about a manager:
Pr (θ = g|s 6= ∅) > Pr (θ = g|s = ∅) . (3)
Stated in terms of primitives, this is equivalent to ρg + τ g > ρb + τ b. We
now show that this condition is necessary and suﬃcient for churning.
Proposition 5 For simplicity, suppose that there are no transaction costs
and no direct beneÞt for the agent: , = 0, α = 0. Then:
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1. There exists a churning equilibrium in which
at (st) = st for t = 1, 2, s 6= ∅
a1 (∅) =
½
0 with probability 1
2
1 with probability 1
2
a2 (∅) = ∅
if and only if ρg + τ g > ρb + τ b.
2. Further, when ρg + τ g > ρb + τ b, there exists no equilibrium in which
the agent follows his signal in both periods: at (s) = s for t = 1, 2 and
all s.
Proof. We use the following notation for unconditional probabilities:
ρ = γρg + (1− γ) ρb = Pr (s = v) ;
τ = γτ g + (1− γ) τ b = Pr (s = −v) .
which implies
1− ρ− τ = Pr (s = ∅) .
Consider the Þrst part of the proposition. Suppose that ρg+τ g > ρb+τ b.
Now, under the (putative) equilibrium strategies, the principals payoﬀ in the
second period is a linear and increasing function of the belief γ. The agent
is kept if and only if γ ≥ γ. Since everyone trades at t = 1, it is easy to see
that γ (χ1 > 0) > γ and γ (χ1 < 0) < γ, and thus r(1) = 1 and r(−1) = 0,
reusing the notation introduced above. Consider γ(χ1 = 0). Since the only
agents who do not trade at t = 1 are the naive managers who receive no
information:
γ (χ1 = 0) = Pr(θ = g|χ1 = 0) =
γ Pr(χ1 = 0|θ = g)
Pr(χ1 = 0)
=
γµ(1− ρg − τ g)
µ(1− ρ− τ) < γ
Thus, r(0) = 0. Therefore r(1) > r(0) = r(−1) = 0. It is then immediate
that the managers best response is as outlined above.
Now suppose that ρg+ τ g ≤ ρb+ τ b. If the equilibrium strategies were as
above, then as before, the agent is kept if and only if γ ≥ γ. Again, under the
putative equilibrium strategies, γ (χ1 > 0) > γ and γ (χ1 < 0) < γ, and thus
r(1) = 1 and r(−1) = 0. However, when ρg + τ g ≤ ρb + τ b, γ (χ1 = 0) ≥ γ,
and thus r(0) = 1. Consider the payoﬀs to a trader who receives a period
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1 signal s = ∅. Given the retention probabilities induced by equilibrium
behaviour, trading without information leads to an expected payoﬀ of β+ 1
2
β,
while not trading without information leads to an expected payoﬀ of β + β.
Clearly, then it is not optimal to churn, and the strategies outlined above
cannot constitute an equilibrium.
For the second part of the proposition, suppose a2 = s2. As in the Þrst
part, the agent is kept if and only if γ ≥ γ. Suppose a1 = s1. The principals
belief is





if χ1 > 0
γ
1−ρg−τg
1−ρ−τ if χ1 = 0
γ τg
τ
if χ1 < 0
.
If ρg + τ g > ρb + τ b,
1− ρg − τ g
1− ρ− τ < 1,





and γ (1) > γ: a fund manager who trades correctly is retained. It is then
clear that a fund manager who observes s1 = ∅ prefers to play a1 = {0, 1}
rather than a1 = ∅.
We conclude this section with a discussion of the second part of Proposi-
tion 5. If inequality (3) is satisÞed, there cannot exist a partial equilibrium
in which the fund manager follows his signal. The condition requires that
observing an informative signal is better news for the managers type than
observing an uninformative signal: a good expert is more likely than a bad
expert to get some kind of information, however ßawed, rather than no in-
formation at all. If this condition is satisÞed and the fund manager follows
his signal, then not trading is bad news about the managers type. The in-
vestor should Þre a non-trader. If explicit incentives are not too large, an
uninformed fund manager would then prefer to churn and there exists no
equilibrium in which the manager follows his signal. In general equilibrium,
it is precisely this lack of sincerity that supports interior bid and ask prices,
which in turn provides a basis for churning as outlined above.
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3.2 Endogenous Contracts
The baseline model postulates exogenously given linear contracts. We now
remove this assumption and we consider endogenous contracting between the
investor and the fund manager(s). First, we show that if long-term contracts
are available, in equilibrium there is no churning (and therefore no trade).
Second, we show that if only short-term contracts are available the results of
the baseline model are still valid.
To begin, consider the following form of long-term contracting. A contract
speciÞes the payment from the investor to the agent and a rule for retaining or
replacing the fund manager. The payment can be contingent on observables,
i.e., on the realized return χt at t = 1, 2. If the investor replaces the manager,
she and the new manager agree on a new contract on the observables at t = 2.
The investor has all the bargaining power: he makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to the fund manager. To make things interesting, it is useful to assume
that the fund manager must receive a minimum non-negative payment w¯ if
he is employed (for every period he is employed). If this were not the case,
the investor would just oﬀer a zero payment in both periods and the fund
manager would be entirely indiﬀerent (and therefore he might as well behave
optimally). As w¯ > 0, we can disregard the fund managers participation
constraint.
Traders do not observe the contract signed by the investor and the fund
manager. We can now prove the following:
Proposition 6 With long-term contracting, trading volume is zero.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with trading volume t > 0. In
such equilibrium, the expected net return is −t,. The investors expected
payoﬀ is bounded above by −2w¯ − t,. But the investor can always deviate
to a diﬀerent contract in which she oﬀers a Þx payment w¯ to the fund man-
ager in each period, a positive amount δ if the investor does not trade, and
she commits not to replace him. Then, the trading volume is zero and the
investors expected payoﬀ is −2w¯− 2δ. As δ can be as small as we wish, this
deviation is proÞtable.
The result relies on the investors ability to commit to retain the current
fund manager (or to replace him for sure). This kills oﬀ career concerns
and therefore churning. Positive trading volumes cannot be supported in
equilibrium.
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We now move on to short-term contracting. The environment is the one
above except that there are two short-lived investors. Investor 1 oﬀers a
contract b1 to the fund manager in the beginning of the Þrst-period and she
receives payoﬀ χ1 − t1. The payment between investor 1 and the manager
may depend on all the observables at t = 1 (but it cannot depend on what
happens in t = 2). Investor 2 is born in the beginning of the second period
and she observes the return obtained by the manager in the previous period
(she does not observe the contract used in the previous period). She then
chooses between the incumbent manager and the challenger and he selects
a contract b2. We can then write a contract as a triple (corresponding to
positive, negative, and zero net returns respectively):
bt = (bt (success) , bt (failure) , bt (no trade)) ,
under the contraint  discussed above  that all three values are not below
w¯. The time line is:
t = 1  Investor 1 speciÞes contract b1;
 The fund manager learns s1 and chooses a1;
 Traders observe a1 and set price;
 Investor 1 observes the net return; All other traders observe v;
Payments to the fund manager are made.
t = 2  Investor 2 observes the net Þrst period return. She retains the
incumbent or hires the challenger. She speciÞes contract b2;
 The fund manager learns s2 and chooses a2;
 Traders observe a2 and set price;
 Investor 2 observes the net second period return; All other traders
observe v. Payments to the fund manager are made.
We show that, under certain conditions there exixts an equilibrium which
is essentially identical to the churning equilibrium which we found in the
baseline model:
Proposition 7 For any w¯ > 0, if the proportion of good traders γ and
trading cost , are low enough, there exists a churning equilibrium in which:
1. Investor 1 selects a ßat contract b1 = (w¯, w¯, w¯).
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2. Investor 2 retains the fund manager if and only if he traded successfully.
In either case, the investor selects a ßat contract b2 = (w¯, w¯, w¯).
3. A good fund manager always trades. A bad fund manager churns if
t = 1 and he does not trade if t = 2.
4. Traders set prices as in Proposition 2.
Proof. Fund managers trading strategy at t = 2. The fund manager
has no career concerns. If oﬀered a ßat payment, she is indiﬀerent among
trading or not trading. Hence, we can assume that a good manager trades
successfully and a bad manager does not trade.
Investor 2s contract choice. As the fund manager is indiﬀerent, the in-
vestor can obtain optimal behavior by oﬀering a ßat contract b2 = (w¯, w¯, w¯),
which is clearly optimal.14
Investor 2s hiring choice. The return at t = 2 is 1
2
(1− γ) − , if the
manager is good and 0 if the manager is bad. Given a belief Pr (θ = g|χ1) on
the incumbents type, the expected net return from retaining the incumbent
is















If , is low, it is a best response for the investor to retain the incumbent if
and only if Pr (θ = g|χ1) ≥ γ.
Investor 2s belief. The belief is the same as in the churning equilibrium
of Proposition 2, namely:
Pr (θ = g|χ1) =
½ 2γ
γ+1
if χ1 > 0
0 otherwise
.
14This is the unique continuation equilibrium of the second-period subgame. To see
this, suppose that the fund manager were using a suboptimal strategy. The investor could
make him strictly prefer the optimal strategy by oﬀering a contract b2 = (w + λ,w,w + δ),
where λ > δ > 12λ > 0 are two positive but inÞnitesimal numbers. A good fund manager
would trade correctly. A bad fund manager would not trade.
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Fund managers behavior at t = 1. Given contract b1 and the continuation
equilibrium at t = 2, the fund managers expected payoﬀ is:
max
a1
E (b1|a1, s1) + Pr (Pr (θ = g|χ1) ≥ γ|a1, s1) w¯.
For a good manager (s1 ∈ {0, 1}), the expected payoﬀs are: b1 (success) + w¯ if a1 = s1b1 (failure) if a1 = 1− s1
b1 (no trade) if a1 = ∅





w¯ if a1 = {0, 1}
b1 (no trade) if a1 = ∅
The fund manager chooses a1 in order to maximize the payoﬀs above.
Investor 1s contract choice. If b1 = (w¯, w¯, w¯), the good manager chooses
a1 = s1 and the bad manager chooses a1 = {0, 1}. Clearly, it is not in the
interest of investor 1 to encourage the manager to choose a1 = 1− v1. The
only other possibility is to induce the good manager and/or the bad manager
to play a1 = ∅.
The minimal amount that the investor must pay in order to make the
good manager play a1 = ∅ is w¯. The minimum amount she must pay to
make the bad manager play a1 = ∅ is 12w¯. Thus, the lower bound to the
additional expected payment needed to induce any fund manager to play
a1 = ∅ is
Cmin = (1− γ) w¯
2
.
The highest net return investor 1 can hope for is when the good manager






















Thus, the upper bound to the additional net return that the investor can get
from using any contract thatis diﬀerent from (w,w,w) is:
Rmax = (1− γ) 1
2
(γ + 2,)
An upper bound to the net beneÞt of inducing the manager to change his
action is:
Rmax − Cmin = (1− γ) 1
2
(γ + 2,)− (1− γ) w¯
2
= (1− γ) 1
2
(γ + 2,− w¯) ,
which is negative if
w¯ > γ + 2,,
which is satisÞed for γ low enough and , low enough. Then, investor 1 prefers
to oﬀer b1 = (w,w,w).
Even with endogeneous contracting, the churning equilibrium of Propo-
sition 2 is still an equilibrium if: (i) only short-term contracts are possible;
and (ii) the proportion of good managers is low. Such equilibrium has the
same high levels of trading volume identiÞed in Corollary 3.
Churning hurts the Þrst-period investor, who faces a negative expected
return (plus trading cost). If churning stops, the investor makes an expected
gain
Rmax = (1− γ) 1
2
(γ + ,) .
The investor can eradicate churning by oﬀering an appropriate contract. The
beneÞt of churning to a bad manager is given by a 50% chance of being hired
again in the next period: 1
2
w¯. To persuade him to stop trading, the investor
needs to set




The expected cost of eliminating churning is thus





+ , is small enough, the diﬀerence Rmax − Cmin is negative, and the
investor is not willing to incur the cost necessary to eradicate churning.
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The damage of churning per churner on investor 1 is 1
2
(γ + 2,). It is
lowest when the proportion of good types γ is low because the bid-ask spread
is narrow. Churning is least costly when there are many churners. Therefore,
if γ is low enough, the beneÞt of stopping churning is lower than the cost of
reimbursing the bad manager for the lost career opportunity.
At a deeper level, the result may also be understood in terms of ineﬃ-
ciencies generated by bilateral contracting in an environment with more than
two agents. Churning increases the probability that the fund manager is re-
tained in the second period. This creates an additional rent to the incumbent
which in part is paid for by investor 2 (who cannot tell for certain between a
good and a bad incumbent) and by the challenger (who is hired with a lower
probability). As investor 1 and the incumbent do not internalize the cost
that churning imposes on the other two parties, they Þnd it optimal to sign a
contract that does not prevent churing. That is why full bilateral contracting
can still lead to socially ineﬃcient outcomes.
3.3 InÞnite Horizon
Churning cannot occur if there is an end-game eﬀect. In the last period,
there are no career concerns and the no-trade theorem holds. But then the
ability of a manager does not matter in the last period and there are no career
concerns in the period before the last. Then, the no trade theorem applies
to the second-last period as well, and so on. In the baseline model we em-
ployed a trick to overcome the end-game eﬀect: we assumed the uninformed
traders do not know in which period they live. In this section we consider an
inÞnite-horizon version of the baseline model and show, in the absence of this
assumption, that there exists an equilibrium with churning. A by-product
of the analysis of the inÞnite-horizon case is a richer characterization of the
dynamics of fund managers reputation.
At each period t, there are: one incumbent fund manager and one chal-
lenger; one short-lived investor; and a large number of short-lived rational
traders. As before, the type of a fund manager is θ ∈ {b, g} and the prior
is γ. In each period a potentially immortal fund manager is born. If the
fund manager is not hired or he is replaced, he dies. In every period, there
is a probability δ ∈ ¡0, 1−γ
2
¢
that a good fund manager becomes bad. A bad
fund manager stays bad. The fund manager maximizes the expected sum of
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future payments (because of δ there is no need for further discounting).15
In every period t there is a short-lived investor who observes all the past
returns and hiring decisions. The investor chooses whether to retain the
incumbent from t − 1 or hire the challenger who is born at t. As in the
baseline model, the contract between the investor and the fund manager is
exogenously given. At the end of t the investor pays the fund manager:
xt = αχt + β,
where the net return χt is as in the baseline model.
In every period t, there are a large number of short-lived rational traders
who have the same information as the investor. As before, the fund manager
submits a market order and each trader oﬀers an ask price pA and a bid price
pB.
To summarize the stage game at t is:
a. Investor t observes χt−1. She retains the incumbent or she hires a
challenger with prior γ.
b. The fund manager observes st and he selects at.
c. The valuation vt is realized. With probability δ a good incumbent
becomes bad. A bad incumbent stays bad.
We prove the existence of a churning equilibrium:
Proposition 8 (InÞnite horizon) For t = 1, 2, ..., deÞne the variables γ
and G recursively as follows:
G1 = γ;





if χt > 0
0 otherwise
.
For α and , low enough, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which:
15A career concern model in which the agents type varies over time is discussed in
Holmstrom [18].
It is easy to see that our assumption that a bad manager cannot become good again is
made just to simplify analysis.
31




θt = g| {χs}s=1,...,t−1
´
= Gt;
2. The investor at t retains the incumbent if and only if Gt ≥ γ;
3. At t a good fund manager trades correctly (at = vt) and a bad fund
manager churns (at ∈ {0, 1} with equal probability);








Proof. Let us begin with the investor at time t. Given her belief, the
retention strategy in (2) is clearly a best response. Given the fund managers
behavior in (3), the investors belief is consistent with equilibrium play. It is
also easy to check that the traders price is the conditional expected value of
liquidation given fund managers play.
To analyze the fund managers behavior, we Þrst need to establish that
the ask-bid prices are bounded away from zero and one. Let
τ (γ) = (1− δ) 2γ
γ + 1
.
The limit of the sequence (γ, τ (γ) , τ (τ (γ)) , ...) can be computed by setting




γmax = 1− 2δ.
As γt < γmax < 1, if , is small enough, a good fund manager has an
explicit incentive to trade (correctly). As the reputational incentive goes in
the same direction, a good fund manager has no proÞtable deviation from
equilibrium play.
Let Ub (γt) denote the expected continuation payoﬀ (sum of the expected
payoﬀs in t, t + 1, t + 2, ...) on the equilibrium path for a fund manager of
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type b if the current belief is γt. We have






























































Ub (γt) > 2β.
The only possible deviation for a bad fund manager is to make no trade
rather than churning. Given the investors strategy a non-trader is replaced.
Under this deviation, the expected continuation payoﬀ at t is simply β. If α
and , are small enough, the deviation is not proÞtable.
The churning equilibrium of the inÞnite-horizon game has a simple struc-
ture. The fund manager in charge always trades. If he is good, he makes a
correct trade; if he is bad, he churns. The investor evaluates the fund man-
agers quality from past performance. A fund manager who has just been
hired has expected ability γ. A fund manager who has been hired last period




where the good news component 2γ
γ+1
is discounted by the exogenous prob-
ability that the manager has turned bad. If the fund manager keeps trading
correctly, the belief is updated in a similar fashion:




The belief is increasing in each successful trade but because δ > 0 it does
not converge to 1. One can show that it is bounded above by γmax = 1− 2δ.
If, at some point, the fund manager makes a wrong trade (or no trade), the
belief collapses to zero. The investor replaces the disgraced manager with an
average manager, and the updating process restarts with γt = γ.
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The uninformed traders have the same information as investors and they
follow the same updating process. At time t, they know they face a fund
manager who knows the true liquidation value with probability γt. The bid-
ask prices they quote reßect their belief: the higher γt, the wider the bid-ask
spread. A fund manager with a long streak of successes will be confronted
by cautious traders. Still, the existence of the upper bound γmax = 1 − 2δ
guarantees that prices are always bounded away from zero and one. If the
transaction cost is low enough, trade occurs.16
3.4 Positive Net Returns for Investors
In all versions of our model, delegation to active fund managers leads to
negative ex ante expected net return for investors. This is because there are
no exogenous traders on the market who are willing to lose money. If the
transaction cost , and exogenous compensation parameters α and β tend to
zero, the net return goes to zero as well.
It is not diﬃcult to ensure positive returns from delegation by introduc-
ing a small amount of exogenous noise trade. It is more interesting (and
algebraically simpler) to perform this exercise in the inÞnite-horizon model.
SpeciÞcally, re-consider the model in the previous subsection but assume that
in every period t a noise trader is present with probability η > 0 (indepen-
dent across time and from other events). For unmodeled reasons, the noise
trader must buy one unit of the asset with probability 1
2
and must sell one
unit with probability 1
2
(See Glosten and Milgrom [14]).
As before, there are a large number of uninformed traders at every period
t. Each of them can buy at most one unit and sell at most one unit. Each
of them posts an ask price pA and a bid price pB. The noise trader and the
fund manager look for the best prices. Trades are anonymous: a trader who
receives an order does not know who made the order.17 The bid-ask prices
are then equal to the expected liquidation value of the asset conditional on
that trader receiving a buy order or a sell order. For the rest, the game is
exactly as in the baseline case.
16Like in the baseline model, the expected proÞt of an investor is still strictly negative
at every t. As before, uninformed traders must make a zero expected payoﬀ given γt. The
funds expected gross return is zero and the investor is left to pay the managers fee and
the transaction cost.
17We assume that the number of uninformed traders is large enough that the probability
that the noise trader and the fund manager go to the same trader is negligible.
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It is easy to check that Proposition 8 holds as stated, except that trading
occurs at diﬀerent prices. If the trader is faced with a buyer, he faces a good
fund manager with probability γt
1+η
, a bad manager with probability 1−γt
1+η
,
and a noise trader with probability η
1+η
. The ask price equals the expected


























It is easy to see that p0A,t < pA,t and p
0
B,t > pB,t, and thus prices are (not
surprisingly) less informative in the potential presence of a noise trader. In
addition, the prices with noise trading converge smoothly to the original
prices as the probability of noise trade vanishes.
Let us determine the investors expected net return in a frictionless world:
Proposition 9 Fix η > 0. If the transaction cost , and the explicit incentive
parameters α and β tend to zero, the limit of the investors expected net return






Proof. The expected return at t given γt is
E (χt) = γt
¡















































As is well known, the presence of noise trade makes informed trade prof-
itable. The expected net return in Proposition 9 is strictly positive for every
probability of noise trade η > 0. As the amount of noise trade increases, the
bid-ask prices move towards the unconditional value 1
2
: a good fund manager
makes a larger proÞt and a bad fund manager makes a smaller loss.
The expected return is also increasing in the fund managers perceived
ability γt. The uninformed traders still adjust their bid-ask spread in pro-
portion to γt, but the adjustment is now incomplete because some of the cost
is borne out by noise traders.
Suppose that investors are fully rational: they are only willing to use a
fund manager if the expected net return is positive. Proposistion 9 guar-
antees that, if transaction cost and exogenous compensation are small, any
amount of noise trade is suﬃcient to guarantee positive returns to delegation
in equilibrium. Thus, even a tiny amount of noise trade creates the necessary
incentives for investors to delegate investment choices to portfolio managers.
This, in turn, generates implicit incentives which lead to high volumes of
trade via churning, thus vastly amplifying the initial amount of exogenous
noise trade.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the equilibrium features of a Þnancial market
in which a non-negligible share of the market participants are fund managers
who face career concerns. These features diﬀer markedly from the features
of a standard market: prices are less informative and there is more trade.
Uninformed fund manager engage in churning and in equilibrium they behave
as if they were noise traders.
While we have examined several extensions of our model, many interest-
ing avenues of research remain unexplored. First, it would be interesting to
enlarge the set of assets and trades to make the analysis more comparable
to standard Þnancial models such as CAPM. It would also be important to
introduce an element of risk-aversion for both investors and fund managers.
Second, one could consider the presence of multiple fund managers. In par-
ticular, it would be important to study the general equilibrium eﬀect of the
conformistic drive identiÞed by Scharfstein and Stein [29]. Third, our results
were derived in a static trading game. Each security lasts for one period only
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and trade occurs at one speciÞed instant. One should consider a richer set-
ting in which both trading activity and career concerns display their eﬀects
over time. Gu¨mbel [17] develops a multi-period model and shows that the
presence of implicit incentives induces fund managers to take a suboptimal
short-term perspective. Finally, as we discussed in the introduction, the
present model may provide a solution to the trade volume puzzle. But then
one should ask how the career concerns explanation fares compared to the
over-conÞdence explanation (Kyle and Wang [23]). Our theory is falsiÞable:
if an increase in the share of institutional trading is, ceteris paribus, accom-
panied by a decrease in trading volume, we should reject the career concerns
explanation.
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